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MECHANICS' LIENS
BY SUSAN L. COLEMAN* AND LINDA J. PELTIER**
I. REVIEW OF KENTUCKY'S STATUTORY SCHEME
Persons who perform labor or who furnish materials for
the improvement of real property in Kentucky have a right to
a statutory mechanic's lien upon that property to secure pay-
ment for services and materials provided.1 Statutes permitting
the creation of mechanics' liens are designed to prevent unjust
enrichment of the property owner at the worker's expense.2
No right to a mechanics' lien arises, however, unless the im-
provements to an owner's3 property are made pursuant to a
contract with the owner or with the owner's written consent.
4
An owner who has agreed to the improvements may have no
control over the selection of the persons who provide the labor
and materials. Nonetheless, all of the laborers and material-
men5 who contribute to the improvement acquire a right to
assert a lien against the owner's property in the event they are
not paid." The total dollar amount of the mechanics' liens
which may attach to improved property is limited by statute
* B.A. 1971, J.D. 1979, University of Kentucky.
** Assistant Professor of Law, New England School of Law. B.A. 1970, Bucknell
University; J.D. 1973, George Washington University.
I Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 376.010-.260 (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 Comment, Mechanics' Liens-Potential Pitfall for the Homeowner, 62 Ky.
L.J. 278 (1973).
3 The term "owner" as used in this article will ordinarily refer to the owner of
record of real property. It should be noted that the Kentucky statutes also provide
that when a person performs labor or furnishes materials for the improvement of a
mineral leasehold, a mechanic's lien may be asserted against the lessee of the mineral
leasehold. KRS § 376.140 (1971).
4 KRS § 376.010(1) (Supp. 1978).
5 A "materialman" has been defined as "a person who has furnished material
used in the construction or repair of a building, structure, or vessel." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1128 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). A person's status as a materialman is determined
as of the time the material is furnished and under the terms of the contract in effect
at that time. Woodson Bend, Inc. v. Masters' Supply, Inc., 571 S.W.2d 95, 101 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1978). Both laborers and materialmen are within the class of persons eligible
to assert mechanics' liens. See KRS § 376.010(1) (Supp. 1978). The term materialman
is used in this article in a broader sense to refer to all persons who may claim
mechanics' liens.
6 Comment, supra note 2, at 279.
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to the amount of the original contract price.7 The effect of a
assertion of a mechanic's lien may be to impose liability on
property owner for an amount equal to twice the original con
tract price where, for example, an owner has made contrac
payments in full only to learn that his contractor has not paii
for the labor and materials furnished by subcontractorso
In Kentucky, a mechanic's lien, if properly asserted, at
taches to property at "the time of the commencement of th
labor or the furnishing of the materials." Attachment absen
compliance with statutory notice provisions is insufficient b
perfect a lien or to establish priority over other interests i
realty. The statutory notices of which a claimant should b
cognizant are: (1) preliminary notice; (2) notice to the ownez
and (3) final notice.
The preliminary notice10 is a subscribed and sworn state
ment filed by the claimant in the office of the clerk of thi
county in which the building or improvement is located.1 Thi
notice must provide the following information: that the claim
ant has furnished or expects to furnish labor or materials; thi
full amount of the claim that may be asserted;"2 a descriptioz
of the property intended to be subject to the lien; the name o:
7 The Hen shall not be for a greater amount in the aggregate than the con-
tract price of the original contractor, and should the aggregate amount of
the liens exceed the price agreed upon between the original contractor and
the owner there shall be a pro rata distribution of the original contract
price among the lienholders.
KRS § 376.010(1) (Supp. 1978).
8 Comment, supra note 2, at 279. The Kentucky property owner's maximum Ha
bility under a construction contract is greater than that of an owner operating undei
the "New York system" of mechanics' liens, but less than that of the owner operatinj
under the "Pennsylvania system." Under the New York scheme, the Hen is limited t(
the amount due under the original contract. Id. Thus, if the owner has paid the gen.
eral contractor the full price, the materialmen had no right to a lien. Id. at 280 n.20
The Pennsylvania system, on the other hand, allows the Hen to attach to the ful
extent of the fair value of the materialman's contribution, regardless of the status oJ
the account between the owner and the contractor. The owner's potential liabilit
under the Pennsylvania system is, therefore, unlimited. Id. at 279.
1 KRS § 376.010(1) (Supp. 1978); see also Weil v. B.E. Buffaloe & Co., 65 S.W.2d
704, 711 (Ky. 1933).
10 The preliminary notice must meet the requirements set forth in ERS §
376.080(1). KRS § 376.010(2) (Supp. 1978).
1 KRS § 376.080(1) (Supp. 1978).
12 KRS § 376.010(2) (Supp. 1978).
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the owner of the property; and whether the materials were
furnished or the labor was performed under contract with the
owner, contractor, or subcontractor.'" The preliminary notice
does not create a lien, but merely protects the materialman
against claims of priority asserted by a mortgagee or other
person having an interest in the realty.
14
If a preliminary notice is filed and recorded by a materi-
alman prior to the recordation of a mortgage for value, then
the lien asserted by the materialman takes precedence over
the interest of the mortgagee. 5 Absent a filing of the prelimi-
nary notice, however, the mortgage will generally be superior
to the mechanic's lien, unless the mortgagee had actual notice
of the materialman's claim prior to recording of the mort-
gage. 18 This rule, granting priority to real estate mortgages in
most cases in which a preliminary notice was not fied, is
unique; the materialman who does not fie the preliminary no-
tice is nevertheless accorded priority over all other encum-
brances created after the attachment of the mechanic's lien.
Consequently, filing a preliminary notice is not a prerequisite
to perfection of the lien."
Only persons not contracting directly with the property
owner or his agent must comply with the statutory provisions
requiring the materialman to send written notice of his claim
to the owner of the property.19 On claims amounting to less
than $1,000, notice must be given to the owner within sev-
enty-five days after the last item of material or labor is fur-
nished. On claims of more than $1,000, notice must be given
within 120 days after furnishing the last item. 0 If, however,
the materialman intends to assert a lien against "an owner-
occupied single or double family dwelling or the appurte-
13 KRS § 376.080(1) (Supp. 1978).
H Grigsbey v. Lexington & E. Ry. Co., 150 S.W. 687, 688-89 (Ky. 1912).
15 KRS § 376.010(2) (Supp. 1978).
11 Id. See also notes 66-86 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of actual
notice.
17 See Staton Springs Park Co. v. Keesee, 289 S.W. 292, 294 (Ky. 1926).
Is Grigsbey v. Lexington & E. Ry. Co., 150 S.W. 687, 688-89 (Ky. 1912).
I KRS § 376.010(3), (4) (Supp. 1978); see also Siler v. Corbin Bldg. & Supply
Co., 176 S.W.2d 250, 251 (Ky. 1943).
20 KRS § 376.010(3) (Supp. 1978).
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nances or additions thereto," notice must be mailed to the
owner-occupant of the property or his authorized agent not
more than ten days after the first item of material or labor is
furnished.2 1
All notices to the property owner must contain a state-
ment of the materialman's intention to hold the property lia-
ble for his claim and must state the amount of the Hen
claim.2 2 The purpose of this intermediate notice is to protect
the owner against "hidden liens."23 But for this notice re-
quirement, the owner's property would be subject to all mate-
rialmen's Hens for a period of six months after labor or mater-
ials were furnished.24 Receipt of this intermediate notice
enables the property owner to make arrangements with his
general contractor to pay the lien claimants the amount due
them before final payment on the contract is tendered to the
general contractor.25
To protect and preserve a lien claim until the action is
barred by the appropriate statute of limitations, a claimant
must comply with the statutory provisions requiring final no-
tice regardless of that claimant's contractual relationship with
the property owner.2 6 Within six months" from the date that
21 KRS § 376.010(4) (Supp. 1978). See notes 43-86 infra and accompanying text
for a discussion of notice requirements to an owner-occupant.
92 KRS §§ 376.010(3), (4) (Supp. 1978).
23 See Comment, supra note 2, at 282 n.33. "Hidden Hens" are Hens asserted by
those claimants not in privity with the owner. Id.
24 A lien claim must be filed with the county clerk within six months after the
materialman has performed labor or furnished materials. The right to a lien is dis-
solved if this statement is not filed in a timely manner. KRS § 376.080(1) (Supp.
1978). The six-month period may not be extended by furnishing labor or materials
that are frivolous and unnecessary for completion of the contract Vogt v. Cannon
Elec. Co., 54 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Ky. 1932). The time limit may be extended, however, if
the owner requests additional work. Walker v. Valley Plumbing, Inc., 370 S.W.2d 136,
139 (Ky. 1963).
25 See Comment, supra note 2, at 282-83.
26 Fugate v. Taulbee Lumber & Coal Co., 172 S.W.2d 61, 61-62 (Ky. 1943);
Scheas v. Boston & Paris, 101 S.W. 942, 943 (Ky. 1907). The limitations period for
enforcing a mechanic's lien is 12 months from the date that final notice is filed in the
county clerk's office. KRS § 376.090(1) (1971). If the owner of the property against
which the lien is asserted dies prior to the expiration of the 12 month period, the
limitations period is extended for an additional six months from the date on which
the owner's personal representative is qualified. Id. The limitations period for enforc-
ing a mechanic's lien against public property is 30 days after the contractor fies his
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labor or material was last furnished, the lien claimant must
file a subscribed and sworn28 statement in the office of the
clerk of the court in the county in which the building or im-
provement is situated.29 The notice must contain the follow-
ing:30 the amount due the claimant, taking into account all
known credits and setoffs; 1 a description of the property
against which the lien is asserted;3 2 the name of the owner of
the property;3 3 and whether the labor or materials were fur-
nished under contract with the owner, contractor, or subcon-
tractor. A statement may be amended to cure a material de-
fect in the original statement, provided that such amendment
also is filed within the six-month period.3
The claimant's petition to enforce a lien should be care-
fully drafted. All of the statutory prerequisites to assertion of
a mechanic's lien must be alleged and the property charged
must be described. All lienholders or other persons having
an interest in the property, and the property owner or his per-
sonal representative, heirs, or devisees, are necessary and
proper parties to the action. 6 Ten days after the petition has
protest with the public authority. KRS § 376.250 (1971).
27 See note 24 supra for a discussion of the time limits within which a claim
must be filed. Note, however, that a claimant who performs labor or furnishes materi-
als for a public improvement in Kentucky must file the final notice with the county
clerk within 10 days after the last day of the month in which the labor or materials
were furnished. KRS § 376.230 (Supp. 1978).
25 Under a previous version of the statute, it was held that an acknowledgement
of the statement was not sufficient to meet the requirement that the statement be
sworn. Indiana Quarries Co. v. Simms, 165 S.W. 422, 422-23 (Ky. 1914).
29 KRS § 376.080(1) (Supp. 1978).
20 Id.
21 A recitation of the complete account is unnecessary; all that is required is a
statement of the unpaid balance due. Dobson v. Thurman, 191 S.W. 310 (Ky. 1907).
22 The description of the property must be sufficiently accurate to identify it.
KRS § 376.080(1) (Supp. 1978). See also Headrick v. Waterbury, 126 S.W.2d 411, 412
(Ky. 1939); Powers v. Brewer, 38 S.W.2d 466, 470 (Ky. 1931). But see Mivelaz v.
Johnson, 98 S.W. 1020, 1021-22 (Ky. 1907), in which the Court held that a mere error
in describing the boundary of the property does not invalidate the lien.
33 A mistake in the form of the owner's name does not affect the validity of a
lien. Mivelaz v. Johnson, 98 S.W. 1020, 1021 (Ky. 1907).
34 Andrews v. Wilson, 69 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Ky. 1934); Lebanon Lumber Co. v.
Clarke, 152 S.W. 550, 551 (Ky. 1913).
25 KRS § 376.110(1) (Supp. 1978).
36 Id.
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been filed, the court clerk refers the action to the master com-
missioner of the court for a hearing.37 After hearing evidence
of all claims asserted against the property in question, the
master commissioner audits all lien statements and prepares a
report "showing the amount due to each claimant, the nature
and character of the respective liens, and the evidence upon
which each claim was allowed." 8
Once the master commissioner's report has been filed, the
action proceeds as one in equity 9 but may be tried by a jury0
if the contract was between the owner and the contractor.41
After a lien against the real property has been satisfied, the
lienholder must file a release in the office of the clerk of the
county in which the lien was recorded within 60 days from the
date of satisfaction.42
II. NOTICE TO THE OWNER-OCCUPANT OF A HOI
In 1974, the Kentucky statutes were amended to require a
mechanic's lien claimant not contracting directly with the
property owner to provide written notice to the owner-occu-
pant of a single or double family dwelling of his intention to
claim a lien43 not more than ten days after the first item of
material or labor is furnished. Two cases44 recently were con-
sidered by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in which the mean-
ing of "an owner-occupied single or double family dwelling"
was at issue. In each case, a subcontractor fied a lien against
37 Id.
38 KRS § 376.130 (1971).
39 KRS § 376.110(1) (Supp. 1978).
"0 If the accounts or facts are too complicated, a trial by jury may be denied.
McGuire v. Hammond, 405 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Ky. 1966); Reusch v. Hemmer, 33
S.W.2d 618, 619 (Ky. 1930).
41 Scott v. Kirtley, 179 S.W. 825, 826 (Ky. 1915). If the lien claimant is a subcon-
tractor having no contract with the owner, there is no right to a jury trial. Rieger v.
Schulte & Eicher, 151 S.W. 395, 397-98 (Ky. 1912).
42 KRS § 382.365(1) (Supp. 1978). If a timely release is not filed, an action for
judgment releasing the lien may be filed by the property owner in circuit court, KRS
§ 382.365(2) (Supp. 1978), and the petitioner shall be entitled to recover reasonable
attorneys' fees if a favorable judgment is rendered. KRS § 382.365(3) (Supp. 1978).
43 1974 Ky. Acts, ch. 173, § 1 (codified as KRS § 376.010(4) (Supp. 1978)).
4' Smith v. Magruder, 566 S.W.2d 430 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Kinser Sheet Metal,
Inc. v. Morse, 566 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
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a single family dwelling after the general contractor became
insolvent. Notice of the lien claim was given to the owners
within the 120-day period required by statute.45 The validity
of each lien was challenged on the basis that the owners were
"owner-occupants" and that the claims of the subcontractors
were defective since notice had not been provided within ten
days after work commenced as required by the 1974
amendment."
The first case, Kinser Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Morse, in-
volved the construction of a single family dwelling not occu-
pied by the owner until three days prior to the time that the
subcontractor completed his work.47 The second case, Smith
v. Magruder, involved a lien for repairs to a single family
dwelling which was rendered uninhabitable by a tornado in
April, 1974. While the improvements were being made the
owner of the residence temporarily resided in an apartment. 4 8
Confronted with a problem of statutory construction in
Kinser and Smith, the court attempted to ascertain the legis-
lative intent underlying section 376.010(4). Although it was
clear that the purpose of the 1974 amendment was to protect
homeowners against "hidden liens,"49 the meaning of "owner-
occupied" was open to question. Recognizing that the
mechanic's lien statutes have been liberally construed to pro-
tect persons furnishing labor or materials, the Kinser and
Smith courts determined that the legislature intended "own-
er-occupied" to refer to "actual occupancy, and not construc-
tive occupancy."50 The Kinser court defined "owner-occu-
pied" as "premises which are used and occupied as a dwelling
house, though not necessarily on an absolutely continuous and
uninterrupted basis. '51 Applying this definition, the court
held that section 376.010(4) is not applicable to a new dwell-
" See KRS § 376.010(3) (Supp. 1978). See also notes 20-21 supra and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the time requirements.
41 KRS § 376.010(4) (Supp. 1978); 566 S.W.2d at 431; 566 S.W.2d at 180.
4 566 S.W.2d at 180.
48 566 S.W.2d at 430-31.
19 566 S.W.2d at 180; see Comment, supra note 2, at 282 n.33.
1, 566 S.W.2d at 180. See also 566 S.W.2d at 431.
5, 566 S.W.2d at 180-81.
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ing under construction which is not occupied by the owner.2
Consequently, the subcontractor's lien in Kinser was held to
be valid.
In Smith, the court could have applied the Kinser defini-
tion of "owner-occupied" and rendered a decision against the
lien claimant, since occupancy by the homeowner was merely
interrupted. Instead, the court narrowly construed the statute
and held that "actual physical occupancy at the time of the
work is necessary to invoke the protection"53 of section
376.010(4). As a result, "unless the owner actually occupies
the dwelling where the goods or services are furnished, then
the benefits of the statute are unavailable to him and he can
be required to make double payment when his contractor de-
faults after payment by the owner.""
The Smith court's literal interpretation of "owner-occu-
pant," requires results which the legislature surely did not in-
tend. Consider, for example, the situation in which a subcon-
tractor files a mechanic's lien against a double family dwelling
on which improvements were made. If one unit of the double
family dwelling was occupied by a tenant, and the owner of
the dwelling (also a permanent resident of the structure) was
away on a one-week vacation while the subcontractor's work
was in progress, the subcontractor would not be required to
comply with the ten-day notice provision because the owner
did not actually occupy the dwelling when the improvements
were made.
An analysis of the bases of Kinser and Smith indicates
that there is more than one possible construction of section
376.010(4) and that the result in the hypothetical above is un-
necessary and unwarranted. While the purpose of section
376.010(4), to protect homeowners from hidden mechanics'
liens, was acknowledged by the Kinser court,55 consideration
was not given to the possibility that use of the word "occu-
pant" to modify "owner" may have been intended to exclude
absentee landlords from the class of owners protected by the
02 Id. at 181.
53 566 S.W.2d at 431.
Id. at 432 (Lester, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
55 566 S.W.2d at 180.
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amendment. "Occupant" has been defined as "one who occu-
pies, an inhabitant, especially one in actual possession, as ten-
ant, who has actual possession in distinction from landlord,
who has legal or constructive possession.15 It would be rea-
sonable to conclude that the legislature employed "occupant"
to exclude landlords from the statute's protection.
The Smith court's interpretation of the distinction be-
tween actual and constructive occupancy also may be subject
to criticism. Actual possession57 does not require continuous
presence without regard to the surrounding circumstances.
"'[T]o constitute an actual possession. . . it is only necessary
to put [the property] to such use or exercise such dominion
over it as in its present state it is reasonably adapted to.' ,,58
Actual possession does not require a particular act in all cir-
cumstances; what constitutes actual possession "depends upon
the character of [the property] and all of the circumstances of
the case." 59 Indeed the Kinser court recognized that actual
possession does "not necessarily [require occupancy] on an
absolutely continuous and uninterrupted basis."60 Thus, the
court's interpretation of the distinction between actual and
constructive occupancy may well have been misplaced. "Ac-
tual possession" need not have been interpreted to require ex-
clusion of the owner in Smith from the "owner-occupant"
category.
Since the Kentucky Supreme Court has not overturned
the Kinser and Smith decisions, consideration should be given
to amending section 376.010(4) to provide protection to own-
ers of homes under construction and to those who temporarily
reside elsewhere but intend to resume occupancy of the home
in the. near future. An owner in a Smith situation who con-
tracts for a major improvement to his home and vacates the
premises temporarily due to the scope of the work or the un-
" Quist v. Duda, 67 N.W.2d 481, 487 (Neb. 1954) (quoting Parsons v. Prudential
Real Estate Co., 125 N.W. 521, 523 (Neb. 1910)).
" Because "occupancy" is analyzed in terms of "possession" (see text accompa-
nying note 55 supra) it is appropriate to address the requirements of "actual
possession."
Alabama State Land Co. v. Matthews, 53 So. 174, 175 (Ala. 1910).
Olson v. Fedde, 107 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Neb. 1961).
60 566 S.W.2d at 180-81.
1979-1980]
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inhabitable nature of the dwelling is in greater need of protec-
tion from "hidden liens" than the owner who is making minor
home improvements while occupancy is maintained. Section
376.010(4), therefore, should be amended to protect all tempo-
rarily displaced homeowners against the possibility of paying
double the contract amount for improvements to property.
The legislature should also consider an amendment to the
statute to provide protection to owners in situations similar to
that in the Kinser case. Otherwise, since the lien claimant
generally need not give notice of a claim until 120 days after
completion of the work, the owner is placed in the onerous
"position of having to follow up his contractor and determine
from each laborer or supplier (if he is aware of their [sic]
identity) if his contractor has satisfied the obligations.""1 Al-
though the laborers and suppliers "would have to determine
the name and address of the owners" 2 and the type of unit or
building involved, "[t]his obligation is insignificant compared
to the safeguard that would be afforded the owner .... 3
Furthermore, materialmen are in a better position to learn the
business practices and financial reliability of the contractors
with whom they deal than is the owner who may build a new
home only once in a lifetime. 4
To provide adequate protection to those who should ben-
efit from the statutory notice requirement, section 376.010(4)
could be amended, for example, to read as follows:
No person who has not contracted directly with the owner
[-occupant] or his authorized agent shall acquire a lien
under this section on a [an owner-occupied] single or double
family dwelling used as a homestead by the owner or the
appurtenances or additions thereto unless he notifies in
writing the owner[-occupant] of the property to be held lia-
ble or his authorized agent not more than ten (10) days after
the first item of material or labor is furnished of the delivery
of the material or performance of labor and of his intention
to hold the property liable and the amount for which he will
61 566 S.W.2d at 432 (Lester, J. concurring).
62 Id.
63 Id.
" Id. at 432-33.
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claim a lien. As used in this subsection, "homestead" shall
include, but not be limited to, a single or double family
dwelling under construction and shall include a dwelling
used by the owner as a homestead but which is presently
unoccupied due to a temporary absence.6 5
By deleting the word "occupant" from the statute or by re-
quiring expedited notice to the "owner or occupant" of a lim-
ited-capacity dwelling, the legislature would offer appropriate
protection to small homeowners and guard against future in-
equitable results.
III. PRIORITY CONTESTS BETWEEN MECHANICS' LIENS
CLAIMANTS AND MORTGAGEES
A. What Constitutes "Actual Notice" to the Mortgagee
A mechanic's lien claimant will prevail over a real estate
mortgagee only if the mortgagee had actual or constructive
notice of the lien prior to the recording of the mortgage," or,
in the case of a discretionary loan, prior to disbursement of all
of the loan proceeds.6 7 Constructive notice may be given by
filing a preliminary notice of the lien claim with the court
clerk in the county in which the property is located.6 8
During this past term, the Kentucky Court of Appeals in
Proposed deletions from the text of the existing statutory provision, KRS §
376.010(4) (Supp. 1978), have been placed in brackets. Proposed additions to that
subsection are indicated by italics.
66 If the mortgagee has actual or constructive notice of the mechanic's lien claim
prior to the recordation of the mortgage, the mechanic's lien claim is accorded prior-
ity by statute. KRS § 376.010(2) (Supp. 1978). In two recent Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals decisions, reference was made to a broad statement of the rule, applied in other
jurisdictions, that the mortgage must have been recorded before commencement of
labor or the furnishing of materials if this priority rule is to be invoked. Percy Gal-
breath & Son v. Watkins, 560 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Professional Con-
structors, Inc. v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., No. CA-959-MR (Ky. Ct. App.
Dec. 9, 1977). This rule does not apply in Kentucky, because KRS § 376.010(2)
(Supp. 1978) and the interpreting case law, Kentucky Lumber & Mill Work Co. v.
Kentucky Title Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 211 S.W. 765, 768 (Ky. 1919), provide that a
mechanic's lien is inferior to a mortgage unless the mortgagee had actual or construc-
tive notice of the lien. The fact that work commenced on the project prior to recorda-
tion of the mortgage is inconsequential.
'7 Kentucky Lumber & Mill Work Co. v. Kentucky Title Say. Bank & Trust Co.,
211 S.W. 765, 768 (Ky. 1919); see also KRS § 376.010(2) (Supp. 1978).
68 KRS § 376.010(2) (Supp. 1978).
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Grider v. Mutual Federal Savings and Loan Association,60 fo-
cused on the meaning of "actual notice." In Grider, a builder
signed a note and mortgage to obtain a construction loan70
from the appellee, Mutual Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion. After the mortgage was recorded, the proceeds of the
loan were disbursed to the builder in installments on July 5,
July 31, and August 30, 1974. The appellants furnished mater-
ials to the builder for improvements to the mortgaged prop-
erty, but failed to file a preliminary notice. Their claim to a
lien, therefore, was based solely on the argument that the
mortgagee had actual notice of their claim prior to disburse-
ment of all the construction proceeds.7 1
On July 21, 1974, one of the materialmen, in a conversa-
tion with an officer of the appellee, requested assistance in
collecting a debt of $800 from the builder for materials fur-
nished. The appellee was not advised, however, that the
builder was not paying his bills on time or that he was unable
to do so. Nor was the appellee told that the materialmen in-
tended to file a mechanics' lien. The appellee's past experi-
ence with the builder had been quite satisfactory, for the
builder "'had always paid his bills.' ,72 The materialmen ar-
gued that the mortgagee had received "actual notice" of the
lien under the standard established in Kentucky Lumber &
Mill Work Co. v. Kentucky Title Savings Bank & Trust Co.,73
since it knew "that the [materialmen] had furnished materials
or done labor, for which they had not been paid and for which
they were entitled to assert the statutory lien. '1 4
The materialmen's position finds support in Johnson
Lumber Co. v. Stovall,7 5 and in Ideal Supplies Co. v. Un-
69 565 S.W.2d 647 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
70 Because the court found that actual notice had not been given, it did not con-
sider whether the loan involved in this case was "discretionary" or "obligatory." Id. at
649. See note 67 supra and notes 94-110 infra and accompanying text for a discussion
of the distinction between "obligatory" and "discretionary" loans.
71 565 S.W.2d at 649.
72 Id. at 648-49.
73 211 S.W. 765 (Ky. 1919).
74 Id. at 768.
75 394 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1965).
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derhill,7 6 cases decided after Kentucky Lumber and cited in
Grider." In Grider, the Court stated that a mechanic's lien
claimant could meet his burden of proof78 on the actual notice
issue by "showing that the builder was not paying the claims
as they became due, or that he was unable to do so."17 Yet, in
Collier v. Dillion,80 also cited in Grider,81 the Court stated
that "where the mortgagee knows there are unpaid claims,
and that the owner is unable to pay them,"82 the mortgagee is
charged with actual notice of the mechanic's lien claim. It is
interesting to note that the Collier Court relied on the Ken-
tucky Lumber and Ideal Supplies decisions in determining
what constituted "actual notice.
'83
The Grider court adopted the Collier definition of actual
notice, holding that the mortgagee's knowledge of unpaid
claims by persons entitled to assert a mechanic's lien is not
sufficient to constitute actual notice. "[I]n order to have ac-
tual notice the mortgagee must know that there are unpaid
claims for which a lien may be asserted and that the debtor is
unable to pay such claims or that the claimant intends 'to file
a lien.' "84 While the appellee knew that the materialmen had
claims against the builder which remained unpaid, it was not
advised of appellants' intention to fie a lien and was not
aware of the builder's inability to pay those claims.85 Thus,
the Grider decision imposes on materialmen the task of in-
forming a mortgagee of the fact of nonpayment. Additionally,
the materialmen must reveal that the mortgagor-builder is
unable to pay his debts or the decision requires the material-
men to state unequivocally their intent to fie a lien.86 Under
7" 281 S.W. 988 (Ky. 1926).
77 565 S.W.2d at 649.
7' The mechanic's lien claimant has the burden of proving that the mortgagee
had notice of the lien. Scheas v. Boston & Paris, 101 S.W. 942, 944 (Ky. 1907).
71 Johnson Lumber Co. v. Stovall, 394 S.W.2d at 931 (emphasis added); see also
Ideal Supplies Co. v. Underhill, 281 S.W. at 990.
" 230 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1950).
81 565 S.W.2d at 649.
82 230 S.W.2d at 618 (emphasis added).
83 Id. at 618-19.
8, 565 S.W.2d at 649.
85 Id.
98 565 S.W.2d at 649.
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Grider, an unpaid materialman who seeks priority over a re-
corded mortgage interest in realty should notify the mortga-
gee in writing that labor or materials have been furnished to
the builder on the mortgaged property, that the builder owes
a specific sum for said labor and materials, and that, if this
debt is not paid, a mechanic's lien will be asserted against the
mortgaged property. This notice offers maximum protection
to the unpaid materialman and obviates the necessity of prov-
ing that the mortgagee received "actual notice" that the
builder was unable to pay his bills.
B. Priority Rules Applicable to Construction Advances
A different rule of priority may be applied to the conflict-
ing claims of a materialman and a real estate mortgagee when
the mortgagee advances a portion of a construction loan to the
mortgagor after the mortgage was recorded but after receipt
of actual or constructive notice of a mechanic's lien claim.
Kentucky courts have utilized two distinct approaches in
resolving the conflicting claims of a mortgagee and a mechan-
ic's lienor in such situations.
In 1919, a "mechanical" 87 approach was adopted by the
Court in Kentucky Lumber & Mill Work Co. v. Kentucky Ti-
tle Savings Bank & Trust Co.18 In that case, the mortgagee
had no notice of any lien claim at the time the mortgage was
recorded, although the mechanics' lien claimants had already
commenced labor and furnished materials. The mortgagee
did, however, receive actual notice of mechanic's liens prior to
making two advances (commonly known as "progress pay-
ments") on the construction loan. 9 The Court concluded that
the mortgage attached to the property as the advances were
made and could be enforced against the mortgagor only to the
extent of such advances 0 Thus, the mortgagee's claim was in-
ferior to the mechanic's liens to the extent of the advances
87 G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 117 (2d ed. 1970) [here-
inafter cited as OSBORNE].
88 211 S.W. 765, 769 (Ky. 1919).
" Id. at 767-69.
8 An advance becomes a mortgage "for value" within the meaning of KRS §
376.010(2) only when the advance is made. 211 S.W. at 769.
SURVEY-MECHANICS' LIENS
made subsequent to receipt of knowledge of the lien.' 1 The
Court justified this result on the basis that it would be inequi-
table to permit a mortgagee with notice of materialmen's
claims against the property to destroy their liens by making
later advances on the loan.
92
The mechanical approach has been criticized for treating
the mortgage "'as arising at and from the act of making the
advance, instead of from the previous executory agreement by
which the land was bound as security for future advances.' "93
In 1977, the Kentucky Court of Appeals ignored the mechani-
cal approach of Kentucky Lumber and adopted the priority
rule9 used by the majority of courts. 95 This rule requires the
court to ascertain whether a mortgage is "discretionary" or
"obligatory." If a mortgage advance may be made at the op-
tion of the mortgagee and is thus discretionary, a mechanic's
lien claimant will be accorded priority over that portion of the
mortgagee's interest represented by advances made after the
mortgagee received notice of the mechanic's lien claim. The
mortgagee's claim will be superior only to the extent of ad-
vances made prior to the time he received notice of the
mechanic's lien.'6 On the other hand, if the terms of the origi-
nal mortgage loan mandate the later advances, the mortga-
gee's claim will have priority over mechanic's liens as to any
future advance made, even though the mortgagee had notice
of the lien when making the advance.' 7
The discretionary-obligatory approach has been criticized
as giving the judiciary excessive latitude in characterizing a
loan:
There are few, if any, future advance clauses which an as-
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 OSBORNE, supra note 87, § 114 (quoting 3 G. GLENN, MORTGAGES § 399 (1943)).
1' Professional Constructors, Inc. v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., No. CA-
959-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1977), rev'd, 579 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1979); Percy Gal-
breath & Son v. Watkins, 560 S.W.2d 239, 241-42 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
"I See OSBORNE, supra note 87, § 118-20.
"1 560 S.W.2d at 241 (citing Professional Constructors, Inc. v. Merchant's Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., No. CA-959-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1977)); see also OSBORNE,
supra note 87, § 120.
" OSBORNE, supra note 87, § 120.
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tute judge cannot, at will, classify on one side or the other of
the line between obligatory and voluntary. When he has
picked his label he has also picked his priority rule. The dis-
tinction amounts to an absence of rule; the judges are in-
vited to pick and choose, case by case, ad hoc or ad
hominem9
The validity of this criticism is demonstrated by the court of
appeals' decision in Professional Constructors, Inc. v.
Merchants National Bank & Trust Co., in which a majority of
the court found that a construction loan was "obligatory"
since a specific amount of money was loaned and the words
"up to," "not exceeding," or other words of qualification were
not contained in the promissory note or in the construction
mortgage. Upon reexamination of the same documents, how-
ever, Judge Howerton sharply disagreed with this
characterization.9
The rule of Professional Constructors, that a loan is dis-
cretionary only if it contains appropriate qualifying words,
98 Id., quoting G. Gm.MORE, SECURrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 930
(1965).
11 No. CA-959-MR at 9. In his concurring opinion Judge Howerton remarked
that the majority's conclusion "that Merchants was obligated to transfer
$1,125,000.00 to the borrower, even if the amount was surplus to the cost of acquiring
the land and constructing the improvements" was "simply ... not correct." Id. The
loan documents provided that the full amount of the loan would be disbursed to the
borrower only if the property was developed without any defaults. Further evidence
of the "discretionary" nature of the loan was found by Judge Howerton in the lan-
guage of the loan agreement and the note:
The loan agreement provided that Merchants was to lend to the borrower -
"such amount not to exceed the principal sum of $1,125,000.00 as shall be
necessary for the purpose of ... construction of the improvements thereon.
The note held by Merchants provided that the maker was obligated to pay
$1,125,000.00, or so much thereof as shall be advanced to the maker ..
Id. (emphasis added).
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision and sum-
marily determined that the loan was discretionary because Merchants was under no
obligation to disburse the full amount of the loan. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Professional Constructors, Inc., 579 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Ky. 1979). By treating the
discretionary-obligatory loan issue in a perfunctory manner, the Court leaves in
doubt whether Kentucky has abandoned the mechanical approach of Kentucky Lum-
ber in favor of the"discretionary-obligatory" priority rule used by the majority of
courts. See text accompanying notes 87-97 supra for an explanation of the two rules.
If the Court intended to adopt the majority rule, it failed to fashion any definitive
guidelines for use in determining whether a loan is "discretionary" or "obligatory."
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does not fully resolve the difficulty of determining whether a
loan is discretionary or obligatory. For example, courts have
disagreed as to whether a loan may be regarded as "obliga-
tory" when the agreement permits the mortgagee to refuse to
make future advances after the mortgagor has defaulted.100 In
such cases some courts have held that the advances are discre-
tionary and priority is given to intervening mechanics liens
when the mortgagee made construction advances after default
by the mortgagor.' 0 '
This latter approach was utilized by the Kentucky Court
of Appeals in Percy Galbreath & Son v. Watkins,0 2 where a
mortgagee made advances to complete a construction project
after default by the mortgagor and with knowledge of inter-
vening mechanic's liens. The promissory note was for the
principal sum of $193,000 or "as much thereof as may be ad-
vanced.'10 3 The construction agreement provided that in the
event the borrower failed to complete the work the lender-
mortgagee had the option of either using the undisbursed
funds to complete the work itself, applying such funds toward
retirement of the principal, or disbursing such funds to un-
paid materialmen.104 The court labelled the loan "discretion-
ary" and held that the mechanic's lien claimants were entitled
to priority over the mortgagee to the extent of sums advanced
after the mortgagor's default. 05 The court based its decision
on the optional nature of the advances as evidenced by the
wording of the promissory note. 06
Despite criticism, the "discretionary-obligatory" approach
is preferable to a mechanical approach. A mortgagee who is
bound to make periodic advances as of the date of the con-
tractual commitment has, in effect, given value equal to the
full amount of the construction loan. In such a case, when the
contract is executed and the mortgage recorded prior to re-
ceipt of notice of potential claims by materialmen, the mort-
100 Annot., 80 A.L.R. 2d 179, 199 (1961).
101 Id. at 201.
102 560 S.W.2d 239 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
103 Id. at 241.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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gagee should be entitled to priority over such claims without
regard to any subsequent notice of the mechanics' liens. By
the same token, a mortgagee has no compelling need for pro-
tection with regard to advances made without prior contrac-
tual commitment and with knowledge of intervening material-
men's claims. 10 7 Indeed, to accord priority to the mortgagee in
such a case would prejudice the rights of the other creditors of
the mortgagor.108
Percy Galbreath leaves unresolved the extent of the con-
tinuing validity of the mechanical approach. In addition, there
remains a problem in determining whether a loan should be
viewed as "discretionary" or "obligatory" when the loan docu-
ments do not expressly make disbursements optional. Because
the terms "discretionary" and "obligatory" are easily manipu-
lated by the courts in the absence of any express characteriza-
tion in the loan documents, guidelines should be formulated
to assist the courts and future mortgagees in ascertaining the
status of periodic construction loan payments.108 In the for-
mulation of such guidelines, accepted rules of contract inter-
pretation should play an important role.110 Of equal signifi-
cance, however, are issues of public policy. Thus, courts
should consider the relative protections necessary for institu-
tional lenders and unpaid laborers and suppliers, based per-
haps in part upon the influence and control these groups may
independently exert on a builder-mortgagor and upon their
respective capacities to bear the losses occasioned by a mort-
gagor's default.
IV. OTHER REMEDIES FOR UNPAID MATERIALMEN
A. Right to an Equitable Lien
Even if an unpaid materialman fails to perfect his
107 560 S.W.2d at 242.
108 OSBORNE, supra note 87, § 117a.
109 See note 98 supra and accompanying text for an illustration of why guidelines
are so essential.
110 Thus, for example, emphasis may be placed on the intention of the parties to
the agreement, to the extent to which that intention may be discernible. L. SImPsoN,
LAw OF CONTRACTS 210 (2d ed. 1965). In addition, the words of a contract will gener-
ally be construed most strongly against the party who uses them. Id. at 212.
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mechanic's lien or if the mortgagee has priority over a per-
fected mechanic's lien, the materialman nevertheless may be
able to recover the amount due for services performed or
materials furnished. For example, the court of appeals in Pro-
fessional Constructors, Inc. v. Merchants National Bank &
Trust Co.,111 granted a materialman an equitable lien on un-
disbursed construction loan proceeds.1 2 A property owner en-
gaged in the construction of a manufacturing and commercial
facility executed with a co-mortgagor a note and mortgage to
Merchants National Bank in exchange for a $1,125,000 loan.
After the mortgage was recorded, the owner-mortgagor en-
tered into a lump sum contract with the appellant, Profes-
sional Constructors, Inc. (Pro Con), which was to serve as the
general contractor for the project." 3
Payment for construction costs was to be made in accord-
ance with an elaborate system. On a monthly basis, Pro Con
would complete and forward to the owner lien releases, lien
waivers and an application and certificate for payment indi-
cating the charges for the amount of work done. The owner
and his co-mortgagor would check the work and draft checks
payable to Pro Con or to Pro Con and the subcontractor or
supplier. The appellee bank would then receive a copy of Pro
Con's application together with instructions to transfer to the
owner's account the funds necessary to cover the charges
made. Each application showed that ten percent of the
amount requested by Pro Con was to be held as retainage.
The contract between Pro Con and the owner specified that
the retainage would be paid to Pro Con upon satisfactory
completion of the project.1
4
Pro Con completed its work and obtained a permanent
certificate of occupancy on May 21, 1975. Because the owner
had abandoned the project, Pro Con submitted its last request
for funds to the co-mortgagor which failed to transmit this
" No. CA-959-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1977), rev'd, 579 S.W.2d 100 (Ky.
1979).
112 The Kentucky Supreme Court did not consider the equitable lien issue in its
opinion in Professional Constructors. The issue was mooted by the Court's finding
that the loan advances were discretionary rather than obligatory. 579 S.W.2d at 102.
'13 No. CA-959-MR at 1-2.
114 Id. at 3-4.
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request to the appellee bank. After receiving the certificate of
occupancy on August 8, 1975, the bank declared the note and
mortgage in default. At that time the bank possessed undis-
bursed loan proceeds in the amount of approximately
$169,000. Subsequently, Pro Con filed a mechanic's lien for
final labor and materials furnished in the amount of
$71,621.41 and claimed an additional $50,848, the amount of
retainage held by the appellee bank.115
The court of appeals concluded that Pro Con's asserted
mechalnic's lien was subordinate to the mortgage of the appel-
lee bank,116 because the loan made by the bank was "obliga-
tory" rather than "discretionary"'11 and because the mortgage
had been recorded prior to the commencement of labor or the
furnishing of materials.118 Consequently, Pro Con's claim of a
statutory lien could not provide a basis for recovery. The
court, however, raised sua sponte the issue of Pro Con's right
115 Id. at 4-5. The court of appeals concluded that there could be "no question"
that Pro Con was entitled to recover the undisbursed retainage of $50,848, since this
sum was held by the bank "for the use and benefit of Pro Con .... ." No. CA-959-
MR at 6. The Kentucky Supreme Court, however, denied Pro Con's claim to that
fund, emphasizing its view that the loan was discretionary in nature and that the
retainage could not be deemed to have been disbursed.
The retainage was not placed in a special fund. It was not withdrawn from
the bank, nor was it placed in Dues' bank account in any respect.
Merchants [Bank] learned of the abandonment of the project and made no
further distribution. There was no obligation on Merchants to distribute or
deposit any money in Dues' account and none was distributed or placed in
its account.
Merchants Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Professional Constructors, Inc., 579 S.W.2d
100 (Ky. 1979). It would appear, therefore, that this harsh result might be avoided in
cases in which the pertinent construction contract contains provisions requiring the
owner-mortgagor either to instruct the bank-mortgagee to transfer the retainage
funds to a special retainage account in the names of both the owner and general
contractor, or to withdraw the amount of the retainage fund due as each disburse-
ment is made by the bank-mortgagee. In the absence of a clear indication in the
construction agreement between the owner and the general contractor that such dis-
bursement or segregation of the retainage fund is mandatory, the general contractor's
right to the retainage fund will be jeopardized. The Court has made it clear that mere
knowledge of the retainage fund by the bank-mortgagee is insufficient to establish an
equitable lien against funds held by the bank.
116 The Supreme Court later reversed this finding, concluding that the loan was
discretionary rather than obligatory. 579 S.W.2d at 103.
" See notes 96-110 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinc-
tion between "discretionary" and "obligatory" loans.
"' No. CA-959-MR at 2.
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to an equitable lien for final labor and materials furnished,
and held that Pro Con, as the general contractor, was entitled
to an equitable lien on the undisbursed loan proceeds in the
hands of the bank.119
A minority of courts will award equitable liens on undis-
bursed construction loan funds,120 but only when "special or
peculiar equities" are found to exist in favor of the lien claim-
ant.121 Failure to perfect a mechanic's lien does not foreclose
one who has furnished labor, materials, or services for a con-
struction project from seeking an equitable lien. On the other
hand, "the right of subcontractors or materialmen to an equi-
table lien is not established merely by filing a mechanic's lien
claim. 1 22 The rationale of the equitable lien remedy is that
"it would be inequitable and unjust to withhold from those
persons who have by their labor and materials enhanced the
value of the property the loan fund which constituted a mate-
rial inducement to them in supplying such labor and materials
upon which they relied for reimbursement.1 23 But for such a
remedy, the lender's security would be unjustly enriched by
the labor and materials furnished at the expense of the sup-
pliers. 24 A contractor, subcontractor, or materialman claiming
an equitable lien must prove that he justifiably relied on the
construction loan fund for payment.
25
The amount and sufficiency of evidence necessary to
prove such justifiable reliance are, however, uncertain. In
Swinerton & Walberg Co. v. Union Bank,26 a California deci-
sion cited by the court in Professional Constructors,27 the
mere creation of the loan fund was found to have induced the
119 The amiunt of the equitable lien to which Pro Con was entitled was said to
be a question for determination in further proceedings. An award of a summary judg-
ment for the bank was reversed, and the case was remanded. Id. at 8.
120 Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 848, 853 (1973).
12 Hall's Miscellaneous Ironworks, Inc. v. All S. Inv. Co., 283 So.2d 372, 374
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
122 McBain v. Santa Clara Say. & Loan Ass'n, 51 Cal. Rptr. 78, 83 (Dist. Ct. App.
1966).
122 Id.
124 Id.
'25 See Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 848, 853-59 (1973).
126 101 Cal. Rptr. 665, 668 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
127 No. CA-959-MR at 7.
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suppliers to rely upon the fund for payment. Arizona courts,
however, have taken a position contrary to that in Swinerton,
holding that the "real question is whether the parties in-
tended that the fund or property upon which the lien is
claimed was to be security or collateral for payment. ' 128 Con-
sequently, Arizona materialmen may be precluded from as-
serting an equitable lien when a provision in the construction
loan agreement states that the fund is created for the sole
protection of the borrower and lender, and not for the benefit
of unpaid suppliers.
129
A third approach to establishing justifiable reliance is re-
flected in the California case of McBain v. Santa Clara Sav-
ings & Loan Association,5 " in which the court stated that
persons supplying labor or materials were entitled to an equi-
table lien if they had "been induced by either the borrower or
the lender to rely on the construction loan funds for pay-
ment." 31 Such inducement may take the form of conversa-
tions between the suppliers and the lender or the borrower in
which the suppliers are told that they are to be paid from the
construction loan fund.13 2 Furthermore, in Miller v. Mountain
View Savings & Loan Associaton,1 33 the California court de-
termined that reliance upon this fund is justified when the
lender utilizes a system of progress payments to the contrac-
tor from a loan fund in the hands of an escrow agent.
To prove entitlement to an equitable lien, a general con-
tractor may also be required to establish that the construction
'1 Pioneer Plumbing Supply Co. v. Southwest Say. & Loan Ass'n, 428 P.2d 115,
121 (Ariz. 1967).
129 See, e.g., id. at 122. But see Swinerton & Walberg Co. v. Union Bank, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 665, 670 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972), in which it was determined that a construction
agreement between a lender and a borrower did not foreclose a supplier's claim to the
undisbursed loan proceeds, although it provided that the supplier had no right to the
funds. The court said that an equitable lien "has an independent, noncontractual
basis." Id.
120 51 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
11 Id. at 89.
'2 Id. at 85-86. The Arizona courts have disagreed with the McBain position,
stating that an equitable lien may only be awarded if the lender induced the contrac-
tor to rely on the construction loan fund. Pioneer Plumbing Supply Co. v. Southwest
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 428 P.2d 115, 121-22 (Ariz. 1967).
133 48 Cal. Rptr. 278 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
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project is completed."" On the other hand, some courts have
taken the position that completion of the construction project
is not a condition precedent to an award of an equitable
lien.
135
The decision in Professional Constructors allowing Pro
Con an equitable lien upon undisbursed loan funds can be
supported under either a Swinerton or a Miller analysis.13 6
The construction project was completed and all outstanding
claims had been paid by Pro Con. Therefore, the second ele-
ment necessary to establish an equitable lien claim under
Miller was clearly present. While the court of appeals in Pro-
fessional Constructors appeared to prefer the Swinerton ap-
proach that mere creation of a fund can induce suppliers to
rely upon it,137 it failed to state definitively the basis for its
award of an equitable lien; the type of evidence necessary to
establish justifiable reliance; and whether completion of con-
struction is a condition precedent to assertion of such a lien.
On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals' decision in Professional Constructors. After
characterizing the loan as "discretionary," the Court rejected
Pro Con's demand for an equitable lien against undisbursed,
"discretionary" loan proceeds held by the mortgagee, since
"the undistributed funds did not constitute a part of the loan
until actual distribution had been made."'13 8 The Court's opin-
184 See, e.g., J.G. Plumbing Serv., Inc. v. Coastal Mortgage Co., 329 So.2d 393
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). There, the Florida court explained its decision, stating that
"the market value of a partially constructed building will be substantially less than
the total cost of the labor and materials which has [sic] already been incorporated
into its construction. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the mortgagee
has been unjustly enriched." Id. at 395.
51 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
16 Since the issue of award of an equitable lien was not raised at the trial court
level, it is not clear whether Pro Con would have been entitled to an equitable lien
under the Arizona or the McBain views of proof of justifiable reliance.
127 No. CA-959-MR at 7 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1977), reu'd, 579 S.W.2d 100 (Ky.
1979).
138 579 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Ky. 1979). If the bank had notice that Pro Con had filed
a mechanic's lien or intended to do so (see text accompanying notes 68-86 supra), Pro
Con's lien would have received priority over the mortgagee's interest, since each dis-
tribution was made subsequent to the mortgagee having received notice of the lien
claim. "This avenue was abruptly closed" because Pro Con signed a release of lien
prior to each distribution. 579 S.W.2d at 103. Subsequent to the filing of Pro Con's
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ion seems to suggest that a claim for an equitable lien could
be asserted successfully against undisbursed, "obligatory"
loan funds.139 Thus, to the extent that this interpretation is
sound, the portion of the court of appeals' opinion relating to
equitable liens remains significant. The law of equitable liens
in the area of construction financing is clearly in the develop-
mental stage, however, and numerous issues remain
unresolved.
B. Marshaling of Assets
Charles White Co. v. Percy Galbreath & Son'40 began as
a mortgagee's foreclosure action, brought by Percy Galbreath
& Son, which held a mortgage on certain property and an as-
signment of rents from the lease of the property after comple-
tion of construction. Nineteen materialmen with recorded
liens in excess of $130,000 were named as defendants. The
special commissioner recommended a finding that Percy Gal-
breath had, after crediting $45,000 to it for rent collected after
the building was completed, a superior lien in the amount of
$170,260.57. A judicial sale of the property subject to the lease
was held, and a high bid of $201,000 was entered. Before the
circuit court approved the sale, several of the materialmen,
appellants in this case, moved to compel the sale of the lease-
hold interest for first satisfaction of Percy Galbreath's debts,
basing their motion on the doctrine of marshaling of assets.
4 1
On appeal, the court concluded that the equitable doctrine of
marshaling of assets was not available in this case to protect
materialmen with claims inferior to the mortgagee's. 42
Marshaling of assets embraces the "two funds" rule:
lien, the mortgagee bank made no further distributions on the loan. Id. at 102.
Once it had determined that the loan was discretionary, the Court could have
responded that since the mortgagee had discretion in determining whether to make
an advance, Pro Con did not justifiably rely on the loan fund for payment and
thereby failed to satisfy a prerequisite to assertion of the claim for an equitable lien.
See Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 848, 853-59 (1973).
" 579 S.W.2d at 103.
0 563 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
141 Id. at 480.
142 Id. at 481. The reasons for this decision are discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 153-56 infra.
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Where two or more creditors seek satisfaction out of the as-
sets of their debtor, and one of them can resort to two
funds, whereas another creditor has recourse to only one of
the funds-for example, where a senior or prior mortgagee
has a lien on two parcels of land, and a junior mortgagee has
a lien on but one of the parcels-the former may be required
to seek satisfaction out of the fund which the latter creditor
cannot touch so that by this means of distribution both
creditors may be paid, or the single-fund creditor may, if
possible, have his claim satisfied out of the fund which is
subject to the claims of both creditors.1
4 3
The marshaling of assets doctrine can provide significant re-
lief to a junior encumbrancer, since it compels the paramount
creditor to satisfy his debt out of the fund unavailable to the
junior encumbrancer, thus resulting in little or no impairment
of the security of the junior encumbrancer.
4 4
As a general rule, the marshaling of assets doctrine may
be invoked by a court of equity only if all of the following
elements are present: (1) the litigants are creditors of the
same debtor;14 5 (2) there are two funds belonging to the
debtor;14 6 (3) only one of the creditors has a right to claim
both funds; 147 (4) marshaling of assets is necessary to secure
the claim of the junior creditor;148 (5) complete satisfaction of
the claim of the paramount creditor will not be jeopardized;
1 49
(6) the funds or properties to be marshaled are in existence at
the time the equitable relief is sought; 50 (7) the junior credi-
tor's equitable claim to marshal the assets has been asserted
prior to the sale of the property against which the claim is
made; '5 and (8) the rights of third parties will not be
prejudiced by the claim.
152
143 Annot., 76 A.L.R.3d 326, 327-28 n.2 (1977).
'4 Id. at 329.
45 Comment, Security-Limitations on the Application of the Two Funds Doc-
trine of Marshalling of Assets, 3 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 158, 162, 163 n.22 (1941).
146 Dixieland Realty Co. v. Wysor, 158 S.E.2d 7, 14 (N.C. 1967).
14 Id.
"4 53 AM. Ju. 2D Marshaling Assets § 12 (1970).
149 Calhoun v. Federal Land Bank, 20 S.W.2d 72, 73-74 (Ky. 1929).
111 Dixieland Realty Co. v. Wysor, 158 S.E.2d 7, 14 (N.C. 1967).
'1' 53 Am. JuR. 2D Marshaling Assets § 16 (1970).
"2 See Humphries v. Fitzpatrick, 69 S.W.2d 1058, 1061 (Ky. 1934).
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The court in Charles White Co. concluded that two funds
did not exist, since "a leasehold as security cannot be sepa-
rated from the property for the purposes [sic] of marshalling
of assets. '153 In reaching this decision, the court relied on the
rule that the doctrine may not be invoked when complete sat-
isfaction of the claim of the paramount creditor would
thereby be jeopardized. 15 "Division of the two [realty and
leasehold] would only decrease the value that the leasehold
and the property would have as an entity; causing such a split
to create two funds would run counter to the requirement that
the use of the doctrine not prejudice the prior creditor."' 1 1
Even if the leasehold could have been sold without prejudice
to Percy Galbreath's claim, the appellants would still have
been unsuccessful, since the motion requesting marshaling of
assets was not made until the property had been sold, and, as
a consequence, the rights of the highest bidder would have
been prejudiced.1 50
The appellant materialmen might have prevailed if they
had made their motion requesting marshaling of assets prior
to the sale of the property and if the total of rents collected
after foreclosure and prior to sale would have satisfied Percy
Galbreath's claim. "[W]here rents and profits are collected by
a receiver appointed in proceedings for the foreclosure of a
senior mortgage, the senior mortgagee has two funds out of
which he may satisfy his debt,-(1) the proceeds of the sale of
the land, and (2) the rents and profits in the hands of the
receiver. ' 57 A junior encumbrancer may, by using the mar-
shaling of assets doctrine, "compel the senior mortgagee to
satisfy his debt in the first instance out of the rents and prof-
its, the result being to increase the surplus available to the
"' 563 S.W.2d at 481.
1 See Calhoun v. Federal Land Bank, 20 S.W.2d 72, 73-74 (Ky. 1929).
" 563 S.W.2d at 481. Thus it would appear that the opinion in Charles White
Co. does not absolutely preclude a junior encumbrancer from attempts to marshal
property and the leasehold, if he can establish that a division of these assets will not
decrease the value of the paramount creditor's security.
156 Id. at 480-81.
157 Annot., 95 A.L.R. 1037, 1044 (1935); see also Humphries v. Fitzpatrick, 69
S.W.2d 1058, 1060-61 (Ky. 1934).
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junior mortgagee in the proceeds of the land. '" 158
Since Percy Galbreath's lien did not consume the entire
proceeds of the judicial sale of the property, the court was
faced with determining the relative priorities of the claims of
the nineteen materialmen. The special commissioner stated
that priority was to be based on the order, by date, in which
each materialman and laborer either began work or furnished
materials, and the lower court adopted this recommenda-
tion.15 Both the commissioner and the circuit court appar-
ently thought 6" this order of priority was mandated by KRS §
376.010(1) which provides:
[t]he lien on the land or improvements shall be superior to
any mortgage or encumbrance created subsequent to the be-
ginning of the labor or the furnishing of the materials, and
the lien ... shall relate back and take effect from the time
of the commencement of the labor or the furnishing of the
materials. 16'
The court of appeals held, however, that "the material-
men and laborers with perfected mechanic's liens share
equally" in the proceeds of the sale. 62 To hold otherwise, the
court noted, "'could lead to a ridiculous race to the premises
by materialmen seeking to be first to begin furnishing materi-
als.' ",163 Moreover, to allocate priorities on a chronological ba-
sis would improperly favor those parts of the construction in-
dustry which, by virtue of the nature of the services or
materials they provide, start work early in the building pro-
cess.164 For these reasons, the court construed the language of
the statute stating that a lien "relate[s] back and take[s] ef-
fect from the time of the commencement of the labor or the
"I Annot., 95 A.L.R. 1037, 1044 (1935).
119 563 S.W.2d at 48-81.
160 Id. at 482.
161 KRS § 376.010(1) (Supp. 1978).
162 563 S.W.2d at 482. "Equally" does not mean that the contract price is divided
among the lien claimants on an equal basis; "equally" means that the lien claims are
of equal dignity-all lien claimants shall share in distribution of the contract price on
a pro rata basis. See Schnute Holtman Co. v. Sweeney, 125 S.W. 180, 182-83 (Ky.
1910); KRS § 376.010(1) (Supp. 1978).
163 563 S.W.2d at 482, quoting 4 RICHARDSON, KENTUCKY PRACTICE § 1130 (1974).
164 563 S.W.2d at 482.
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furnishing of the materials" to refer to the priority between a
mechanic's lien claimant and creditors and not to the order of
priorities among the mechanic's lienors.16 5
The result reached by the court of appeals in Charles
White Co. represents a sound application of the principles of
the equitable doctrine of marshaling of assets. In addition, the
court's discussion of the relative priorities of materialmen
with claims subordinate to that of a mortgagee is founded on
compelling considerations of policy and practice. Pro rata
sharing of all assets available to mechanics' lienors as a class
achieves a fair result and avoids the disruption of the con-
struction process by a stream of materialmen and laborers
clamoring to be first to begin their work on a particular pro-
ject. A rule mandating a shared interest in such assets may be
viewed as a special rule applicable to mechanics' lien claim-
ants. Thus, the rule would not be inconsistent with or viola-
tive of the policies underlying the general rule, which favors
allocation of priorities among junior encumbrancers on a
chronological basis. 166
165 Id. The court found support for this view in that portion of the Kentucky law
providing that, in the event that the aggregate amount of liens asserted exceeds the
original contract price, "there shall be a pro rata distribution of the original contract
price among the lienholders." KRS § 376.010(1) (Supp. 1978). Support was also found
in Schnute Holtman Co. v. Sweeney, 125 S.W. 180, 181-83 (Ky. 1910).
168 Note, Mechanics' Liens and Surety Bonds in the Building Trades, 68 YAM-
L.J. 138, 153 (1958).
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